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In conclusion, we will only repeat that those differences themselves have to be fully allowed for in our systems ; that we may not cut out too strait-laced a scheme of study, to be forced upon all minds ; that in an acknowledged course of compromise and selection it were foolish to exact uniformity ; that we should beware how much we pronounce indispensable, and how we allow ourselves to look down upon any one unversed in what our experience has taught us to regard as valuable, since he may have gained from something else that we are ignorant of an equal or greater amount of discipline and enlightenment. Let us, above all things, have that wisdom which consists in knowing how little we know ; and, as its natural consequence, the humility and charity which shall lead us to estimate at its utmost value, and to respect, what is known by our fellow.

W. D. WHITNEY.

ART. V.—FRENCH AND GERMAN DIPLOMACY AFTER SADOWA.

THERE can be few more valuable historical studies than the process by which the people of two great nations grow into antagonisms such as those which led to the recent conflict between France and Germany. Whatever may have been the first impressions excited by the outbreak of hostilities, it is now perfectly clear that the war was not the result of any mere spasmodic madness or desperation of Napoleon. However it may have been with the people of Germany, there can be no reasonable doubt that the masses of the French entered into the war without reluctance, if not indeed with universal enthusiasm. It may be doubted whether the Emperor was ever more popular with the nation at large than on the day when he threw down the gauntlet and made all further postponement of the struggle impossible. The growth of French hostility has been commensurate with the growth of Prussian power. So long as Prussia occupied a purely subordinate position in European politics there was no occasion for any display of hostility, even if hostility existed. But after the battle of Sadowa everything was changed. Then it became apparent that all the smaller

states of Germany, which up to this time had been essentially independent, were rapidly converging, if not upon Prussia, certainly upon a powerful central government of which Prussia was the head, and the result was the awakening of such a hostility on the part of France as afforded the most substantial grounds for alarm. The political antagonism which thus began in trifles, and ended in a desire to seize upon any pretext for war, has a history which may be studied, and which perhaps may not be without its useful lessons.

The wars of Napoleon I. made it evident that every member of the European family of nations needed protection against France. It was felt that, after Leipzig and Waterloo, France, at no very distant day, might, and probably would, seek a revenge; and the conditions of the Treaty of Paris were fixed with a view to make such a vengeance impossible. By this treaty, the French were made to feel a degree of humiliation, inasmuch as the balance of power, which it established, was known to be solely in the interests of those nations with which France had just been at war. In fact the treaties of 1815 were but little more than a solemn warning to France, that in the future she could not disturb the existing relations of Europe without incurring the hostility of all the allied powers. The restrictions thus laid upon a spirited nation could not but weigh heavily. As time wore on, and the necessity of these restraints became less apparent, it was not strange that the French desired relief, and that from time to time they made their desire manifest.

While general considerations of this nature were enough to create a public opinion in the country at large, there were reasons of more than ordinary force which made the treaty odious to the Emperor Napoleon III. The causes of this intensity of feeling would not be difficult to trace, but for our present purpose the fact without its causes is sufficient. At Auxerre, and indeed on other occasions, the Emperor did not hesitate to give free expression to his impatience. Inspired by such a desire to break up, in one way or another, the obnoxious treaties of 1815, he could not but regard the German question as peculiarly opportune; inasmuch as, whatever might be the issue of the war, the obligations of those treaties would no longer be of

any binding force. The question, therefore, opened the most inviting field for the efforts of French diplomacy. Apparently there was everything to gain and nothing to lose.

It was with this question looming up across the Rhine that Napoleon began the political work of 1866. There is abundant evidence that he entered upon the labors of the year with somewhat more than his usual confidence. In the address with which on the 22d of January he opened the session of the Chambers there is conclusive proof that imperialism was strong, perhaps it would not be too much to say, defiant. The external relations of France the Emperor regarded as in every respect fortunate. After commenting upon these relations somewhat at length, he proceeded to discuss in language that could not be mistaken the policy that was to be pursued at home. This Constitution, of 1852, which had been opposed by all liberals, and which even many friends of the Empire had consented to only from a necessity which they believed to be temporary, was referred to in words of most extravagant eulogy. This Constitution, always so obnoxious to the more thinking of the liberty-loving people of the nation, was indorsed as a happy and final conciliation of authority and liberty. It was referred to as embodying the great excellences of the Constitution of the United States, and as differing from that of Great Britain only for the better. In short, the address was a glorification of absolutism. By those who had hoped that the government earnestly desired to enter upon a work of genuine reform, the Emperor's words were listened to with blank despair; by those whose lives had been devoted to freedom they were heard with defiance.

These sentiments of the Emperor, so obnoxious to the friends of liberty in the lower house, appeared all the more significant when followed by the speech of Persigny, in the Senate. The words of this high official were scarcely more than a *rechauffé* of the language of the Emperor, of course with the appropriate reasoning. An elaborate comparison was drawn between the constitutional monarchy of England and that of France, and the conclusion was reached that, for democratic and centralized France, such a parliamentary *régime* as places the authority in the hands of a ministry that is constantly attacked and often

overthrown, could not but result in the most fatal disasters. The trifling debate on the subject which occurred in the Senate is chiefly valuable as showing the almost perfect unanimity of the senators in support of the government.

But the people could not suppress their apprehensions. They had not long to wait for a better knowledge of the Emperor's purpose. On the 1st of February a note appeared in the *Moniteur*, calling attention to the forty-second article of the Constitution, — the obnoxious article which prohibits all publication of the legislative debates save the official reports.* The peculiar significance of the note was in the fact that for a considerable time the article had been allowed by the government to remain inoperative. This had been almost a matter of necessity. So furious had been the outcry, that the prime minister had been obliged to declare that the government did not question the right to discuss and pronounce upon the debates. But any free discussion under the forty-second article was manifestly impossible. If vigorously enforced, the constitutional provision would condemn all the journals either to absolute silence, or to the constant liability of arrest. The government, therefore, without initiating any change in the Constitution, had allowed the obnoxious article to fall into disuse. But the publication of the note of February 1st evidently indicated an intention to revive the constitutional provisions and to enforce them. The note was published, by imperial dictation of course, and was everywhere regarded as evidence of imperial rigor. But it was soon evident that the Emperor had made no very great mistake in estimating public opinion. For, although the question brought into play all the best orators of the lower house, although the logic of poor Persigny was torn into shreds and scattered to the winds by the merciless eloquence of Thiers, yet, whenever there was a division, it was but too apparent that in the Chambers the imperial party was in strong majority, while in the Senate it was wellnigh without opposi-

* The authorized reports were made out in two forms; the one verbatim, the other abridged to the liking of the officials. Any journal, therefore, which chose to present anything of the discussions to its readers must either publish every word uttered, or must be content to print the government abridgment alone.

tion. Thus at the very time when the affairs of Prussia and Austria were ripening for war and were inviting the interference of French diplomacy for the purpose of preventing it, the miniature contest at the French capital had terminated in favor of the government. Although the renewal of the press laws was immensely unpopular, it has to be admitted that the act was not sufficient to shake for a moment either the strength or the confidence of the Emperor. There can be no doubt that, from the unequivocal support which was thus given to imperialism by the legislature, the German policy of Napoleon received much encouragement, if not much of its original inspiration.

The occupancy of the Duchies of the Elbe by Prussia and Austria came up for discussion in the French Chambers on the 2d and 3d of March. The leaning of French sympathy toward Austria was unmistakable. In the discussion the course of Prussia met with almost unanimous reprobation. And yet in the end it was manifest that the policy of the deputies was identical with that of the Emperor,—strict neutrality. In the address to the throne which was finally adopted, there remained not a single trace of that unanimous opposition to Prussia which had been so conspicuous in the debate. Whatever might be the sympathies of individuals, it was thought of the highest importance that the official declaration of the house should give offence to neither party. The address was simply approbation of neutrality in the past, complete liberty for action in the future. The nation must not have her future embarrassed by any indiscreet word uttered in the present.

There seems to be but one way of explaining the fatal policy of the imperial government in regard to the war of 1866. Nothing but a firm belief that his own judgment in the matter was infallible would appear to account for the extraordinary course which the Emperor pursued. That he was willing to stake everything on the confidence with which he awaited the most complete ultimate success of Austria, there is now abundant evidence. It was manifestly not for the interest of France that either party in the contest should be so overwhelmingly victorious, as to be able to consolidate Germany under a single crown. France had, therefore, no word of opposition to raise if the

weaker party desired to seek foreign alliance. The imperial logic would appear to have been this : Prussia is so manifestly wrong in her aggressive policy, that she can gain no considerable support from the smaller German states ; and she is so manifestly weak in comparison with her enemy, that, without the alliance of Italy, she will either not venture into the war, or, if she venture, will emerge from it in a thoroughly crippled condition. But whatever may have been Napoleon's reasoning, it is certain that no objection was interposed to prevent the alliance of Prussia and Italy. The fact has tenfold significance in the circumstance that at the time Italy was so completely under French influence, not to say under French control, that a single whisper of disapproval by the Emperor would have brought the negotiations instantly to a close. Moreover, that Napoleon felt sure of his game is indicated by the course which he had taken at the celebrated interviews with Count Bismarck at Biarritz. Whatever the precise character of those conferences may, in the end, turn out to have been, it is quite certain that the Prussian minister was, at the time, anxious to secure the favor of France ; and it seems quite probable, though it may not be affirmed, that he offered to the Emperor an extension of the Rhenish frontier in consideration of French support to the schemes of Prussia.* The treaty which was drawn up in the handwriting of Benedetti, and published by Bismarck at the beginning of the late war, gives to such a supposition a decided coloring of truth ; for it is hardly possible to suppose that such a treaty was drawn up by the French minister without previous conference and encouragement. The truth in all probability is, that when Prussia was no longer in need of French assistance, she rejected summarily, as too late, substantially the same propositions which Bismarck had previously made to the Emperor and which the latter had declined in hope of getting still better terms in case of Prussian disaster.

* That such an offer was made to Napoleon by Bismarck was boldly asserted by Garnier-Pagès in the Corps Legislatif, and was not denied. The same assertion is made in the recent brilliant, but, for the most part, visionary, pamphlet of M. Renouf on the Diplomacy of Bismarck and Napoleon. In all these negotiations, the papers of importance seem to have been left in Prussian hands ; the world will, therefore, have to wait for the facts until it is for the interest of Prussia to reveal them.

Thus, although the policy of the French was a carefully elaborated one, everything went as Prussia desired. The neutrality of Russia had been easily secured; Italy was bound into a firm offensive and defensive alliance; while France stood proudly aloof, evidently expecting that the war would be long and evenly balanced, and that, at the seasonable moment, she could step forward as arbiter of the dispute and secure for herself the reward she coveted. It is difficult to conceive how any policy could have been weaker than that of the French; for, in case of a decisive victory on either side, the victorious party would be in no mood to hold out a reward for an arrest of its success, and the vanquished would be in no condition to do so, whatever might be its desires. The conclusion to which one is driven is, that Napoleon believed the parties, now that Italy had thrown herself into the Prussian scale, to be so evenly balanced as to make an overwhelming victory on the side of either quite out of the question.

But the Emperor not only showed great diplomatic incapacity in his policy, he displayed still more remarkable weakness in closing up his line of retreat. There can be no question that a most invaluable art in diplomacy is that of a discreet silence. Bismarck has repeatedly shown that this art is by no means incompatible with the utmost diplomatic frankness. But Napoleon seemed determined not only to adopt a weak policy, but also to proclaim it in such a way as, in case of failure, to make the failure as conspicuous and ridiculous as possible. At the very moment when, of all times, the Emperor should have been silent, that is, non-committal, he made the blunder of proclaiming his policy to the world. Only three weeks before the Austrians lost their army and their cause at Sadowa, Europe was made to understand that France would expect an extension of her boundary in case the equilibrium of Europe should be disturbed. This was not held out as a threat, merely; had such been the fact, it might have presented the shadow of an excuse. It was simply a proclamation of what the French ambassador would have been authorized to declare, that is, of what *would have been threatened*, had the difficulties of Austria and Prussia been submitted to a conference of the German states, as Napoleon had recommended.

This famous letter of the 11th of June, which the Emperor addressed to his prime minister, received but one interpretation. In France, as well as in Germany, it was declared that there was as much reason for such a demand at the time the letter was written as when the conference was to have been held; therefore the letter could only be understood to mean that, whatever might be the issue of the contest, France would demand a suitable reward as the price of her neutrality.

Thus the French government was fairly committed to a policy by its own gratuitous declaration. Moreover, it was a policy from which there could be no retreat without something of humiliation, if not of disgrace, in the eyes of the French people. The government, of course, anticipated no need of a retreat. As the anticipations and the purposes of Napoleon appear to have been formed with all the assurance of self-conscious infallibility, no one in Europe could have been more surprised than he at the result of the Prussian advance into Bohemia. But when the disaster came there was no time for hesitation, no time for the development of a new policy. The very day after the Austrians were routed, Francis Joseph ceded Venetia to Napoleon and prayed for his friendly mediation. It could not be declined, of course, for the defeat had been so overwhelming that nothing but an immediate interference would save the Austrian capital. And yet it was evident that the matter was hedged about with the greatest difficulties. On the one hand, there was a formidable party in Italy which insisted that Italian honor could not be satisfied without a direct cession of Venetia, while, on the other, Prussia was in condition to lose by an unsuccessful armistice much of the tremendous advantage which had been gained by the battle. How very desperate the situation was is shown by the fact that before the first preliminaries of an armistice could be arranged, the Prussian troops had overrun Bohemia and much of Bavaria, had taken possession of Frankfort, and the vanguard were already in full view of the spire of St. Stephen's. Under these circumstances, whether an armistice could be secured depended entirely upon Prussia. It was apparent, not only that the war must either be speedily arrested or Austria completely crippled, but also that the terms demanded by Prussia would

become daily more severe just in proportion as her own strength and her enemy's weakness became more conspicuous. The victorious army could not be expected to compromise its military advantage, and therefore nothing short of categorical assurances could lead to an armistice. When the matter was presented by the French government, therefore, the answer of Prussia was immediate and decisive. While there was every disposition to favor the restoration of peace, there could be no thought of armistice, until the mediatorial party made known the fundamental conditions on which a treaty might be negotiated. Prussia did not hesitate to say, without any circumlocution, that, as the first condition of peace, Austria must be excluded from the German Confederation, and must consent to the formation of a new union, with Prussia at its head. The terms were severe, but the situation was desperate, and was daily becoming more desperate. The advance of the Prussian army warned them that, if the terms were not consented to at once, a treaty would have to be signed in Vienna instead of Prague. Had circumstances allowed an armed intervention on the part of France, the situation might have been somewhat relieved. But such intervention was out of the question, for the double reason that the French army was in no condition to take the field, and the French relations with Italy were of such a nature as to make the employment of force in the matter next to impossible. There was nothing to do, therefore, but to submit. The best that France could accomplish was to bind Prussia not to destroy the autonomy of Saxony, and to allow the states south of the Main to form a South German Union in case they should desire to do so. As for the rest, the treaty gave to Prussia everything which she desired.

For the part which Napoleon took in bringing the war to a close no reasonable man will be disposed to condemn him, or even charge him with weakness. It is difficult to see how, after the battle, the wisest statesmanship could have secured better terms for the vanquished. And yet after every good word is said in praise of his part in framing the conditions of the treaty, the fact still remains that the end had come in a manner that had completely revolutionized the political rela-

tions of all the continental governments. If the Emperor had been committed to no policy, he might have accepted the hegemony of Prussia, if not with entire good-will, certainly without any outward betrayal of disappointment or chagrin. But in the fatal letter of the 11th of June he had not only expressly disclosed that the desire of France was that Austria should maintain her place at the head of Germany, and that the other states should remain for the most part *in statu quo*,* but also that any disturbance of the present equilibrium would be regarded as a sufficient cause for the readjustment of the Rhenish frontier.† All of the three conditions on which the Emperor in effect had declared that he should found his claim to an extension of frontier had been fulfilled. Austria had been thrown completely out of the German Empire, the map of Europe had been modified for the benefit of Prussia, and all the smaller German states had been either immensely weakened or completely destroyed.

In the light of these facts, there were evidently but two straightforward paths to pursue; either to push for an advance of the boundary line, or to acknowledge that the imperial diplomacy had been outwitted. The Emperor was in no condition to press his claim, and therefore to present it would make the French situation simply ridiculous. But to acknowledge a diplomatic defeat, in a matter of such supreme importance, would endanger the dynasty, and was not to be thought of. Both of these direct courses were therefore rejected. Until the French army could be put into a condition to enforce its claims, the people must be hoodwinked into a belief that the situation was not, after all, so very undesirable.

The first measure for the attainment of these ends was an effort to make a scapegoat of M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Although completely innocent of the imperial policy, save that he had received the imperial letter, the prime minister was summarily

* The language of the Emperor was as follows: "Nous aurions, en ce qui nous concerne, désiré pour les états secondaires de la confédération *une union plus intime, une organisation plus puissante, un rôle plus important*; pour la Prusse, plus d'homogénéité et de force dans le nord; pour l'Autriche, le maintien de sa grande position en Allemagne."

† "Nous ne pourrions songer à l'extension de nos frontières *que si la carte de l'Europe venait à être modifiée au profit exclusif d'une grande puissance.*"

dismissed, evidently enough for the purpose, on the part of his master, of creating the impression that, if any blunder had been committed, it was to be charged to the account of the minister alone. The dismissal, moreover, would afford an opportunity of declaring through the successor the prospective policy of the government. The peculiarities of the declaration that was actually made can be best understood after one has examined the progress of events in Germany.

No sooner had the result of the struggle at Königgrätz become known, than its importance began to be everywhere felt. Europe at large had to recognize the fact that a new power of the very first magnitude had sprung into existence, and that in the future no international policy could be adopted without regard to its wishes. Moreover, the energy and wisdom of Prussian diplomacy, in using the victory and in caring for the external relations of the country, were no less extraordinary than the success of the army. There was no occasion for any such apprehension as had inspired the celebrated toast of Blücher in 1814, "that the pens of the diplomatists might not undo what had been accomplished by the swords of the soldiers."

Thus with every tendency in its favor, the Prussian government entered upon its work of consolidation. In the king's message of the 17th of August the considerations in favor of absorption were concisely presented. It was argued frankly that, in case the smaller states should insist upon preserving their autonomy, they would be helpless in the event of any collision between themselves and Prussia, while, at the same time, their geographical position would present difficulties and obstructions in the way of their enemy that would far exceed in importance the amount of their actual power. It was not, therefore, from any covetousness of territory, urged the king, but from an obligation, on the one hand, to protect the state which he had inherited, and a desire, on the other, to give to new Germany a broader and firmer foundation, that the necessity arose for uniting the smaller states firmly and forever with the Prussian Monarchy. There was no resisting such an argument as this when it was supported by the power and prestige of Prussia, and accordingly Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, Frankfort, and Schleswig were obliged to yield.

The advantage derived by Prussia from this absorption of territory was not, of course, merely material. It was of vast importance that the population was increased from eighteen millions to twenty-four millions, and that the "sprawling configuration" of Prussia was transformed into a shape at once symmetrical and compact; but of far greater importance was it that by this increase of material power, and by the wisdom of subsequent statesmanship, the nation was able to form such alliances and treaties with the South as brought substantially under one military control the states on the left bank of the Main as well as those on the right. The method by which this military union of all Germany was brought about forms perhaps the most profitable study of the whole period.

As early as the 4th of August, 1866, the king of Prussia made a proposition to the German states in alliance looking toward a treaty of union. It was suggested that the treaty be of binding force for one year, in order that within this time the desirability of further union and alliance might be fully considered. The invitation was accepted; and on the 17th of the following December the plenipotentiaries of twenty-two of the German powers came together at Berlin for the conference. The address with which the session was opened was delivered by the president of the Prussian ministry, and was a model of clearness and frankness. The speaker declared that the old German Confederation had failed of both the objects for which it had been formed; it had neither been able to secure to its members the safety which it had promised, nor had it succeeded in freeing industrial development from the chains which the autonomy of so many states had imposed upon the nation at large. If the new constitution would avoid these deficiencies and dangers, it was of the utmost necessity that the allied states should be bound more firmly together. This end could be best accomplished through the establishment of a military and diplomatic system that would be under a single control, and by the formation of a general legislative body that should have the sole power of framing such laws as would be of general interest to the common country. The necessity which was thought to be universally felt of such an organization, the Prussian government had attempted to provide for in the prop-

osition laid before the different states. That this necessity demanded the surrender of something of individual independence for the benefit of the whole was undeniable ; it was indeed abundantly taught by the lessons of the year. The unlimited independence to which, in the history of Germany, single families and single dynastic territories had carried their isolation was the real cause of that political impotency to which a great nation had hitherto been condemned. This had been manifest in the fact that the political authorities of the several states had never been able to establish any general and continued unity of action. Every one of the individual parts of the common country had been exclusively occupied with the consideration of its own local affairs, without regard to its neighbors ; and this mutual exclusiveness had formed an effective hindrance to the consideration of those interests, which could only receive proper legislative treatment by the nation at large.

After showing in this way the weakness of the old confederation, Bismarck proceeded to point out the means by which this political impotency could be brought to an end. They were, in short, a limitation of the power of the individual sovereignties, an abandonment by the single states of a portion of their independence, for the sake of one common German nationality, the subordination of the single parts to one strong central power, and a general congress or diet to be made up of representatives chosen by direct and universal suffrage.

The favor and even the enthusiasm with which the propositions brought forward by Prussia were received may be best inferred by the surprising rapidity with which the negotiations were brought to a close. On the 9th of February, 1867, the new Constitution was signed by the plenipotentiaries ; on the 12th of the same month the election was held amid the greatest enthusiasm throughout Northern Germany ; and on the 24th the king opened the first session of the North German Parliament.

The address delivered by William on that occasion awakened the utmost satisfaction. It may be doubted, indeed, whether up to the time of his coronation as Emperor any single event in his life has created so much enthusiasm in his favor as this

address of the 24th of February. It would be difficult to imagine anything more fitting to the importance of the occasion than his well-chosen words. He began by referring to the satisfaction with which he addressed such an assembly as for centuries had surrounded no German prince, and then, in words calculated to move the pride of every German, proceeded to speak of the resources of the common country, of the weakness that had come upon the nation in consequence of sectional division, and of the common willingness of all to throw aside these jealousies and weaknesses. The address concluded with these words :—

“ As heir of the Prussian crown, I feel strong in the consciousness that the successes of Prussia have been steps to the restoration and elevation of the German power and honor. The adjustment of the national relations of the North German Union with our countrymen south of the Main is left by the conditions of the treaty of the past year to the untrammelled free will of both parties. For the encouragement of the most complete political agreement, our hand, as soon as we have so far completed our organization as to be in condition to enter into treaty relations, will be ever open to welcome the approach of the South German states. The preservation of the Zollverein, the general encouragement of domestic economy, the establishment of full security for the general protection of the German territory, are fundamental demands which must first of all be recognized by both parties. Upon us alone, upon our unity and our love of the fatherland, depends, at this time, that security for the future of collected Germany, in which, free from danger of falling again into discord and impotence, the nation, in its own self-determined methods, may establish its constitutional restoration and its perpetual welfare, and, trusting in the counsels of its people, may fulfil its peace-loving mission. I cherish the fullest confidence that posterity, in looking back upon the common work, will not say that the perils of the earlier unsuccessful efforts have been without their lessons of usefulness to the German people, but rather that our children will recur with thankfulness to this diet as the founder of German unity, freedom, and power. Through our common efforts may the dream of centuries, the longings and the struggles of the latest generations, be carried forward to the most complete fruition. Full of confidence, — in the name of the allied governments, *in the name of Germany*, — I call upon you: help us to bring the great national work to a speedy and sure conclusion.”

The great influence of this magnificent address in helping on the work of consolidation came from the fact that the king spoke as a German and not as a Prussian. When, in spite of all the pride of Prussian victory and consciousness of Prussian strength, he addressed the diet "*Im Namen Deutschlands*," and not only himself forgot, but counselled others to forget, the name of Prussia, he hit upon the magic word for which Germans had been listening ever since the days of Barbarossa.

In view of the recent establishment of the Empire, it is interesting to notice the impression made by the address of King William upon disinterested parties. In England the discussion of the German questions was most full and intelligent. In France alone the situation was not understood. As we shall hereafter have occasion to notice, the French government, even after the treaty with the Southern states had been signed, believed, or pretended to believe, that a South German Union could be formed which would counteract and resist the tendencies in the North.

The *Wunschzettel* of the French government was, that Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and Hesse should unite in firm opposition to the policy of Prussia; and the Emperor appears to have believed that such a confederation would be no difficult matter to bring about. No doubt, for the predominance of France in Europe, such a confederacy would be in the highest degree desirable. It would give a convenient basis of operation for an alliance with Austria, and in case of need, perhaps, make it possible to bring Prussia and her allies to a second Jena.

But, in all of Napoleon's blunders, there has been scarcely a weaker one than this. From the first, such a confederation would have been unnatural and impossible. Of the four states, the two duchies were already as good as promised to the North. In Baden the Grand Duke and the people alike felt the power of the Prussian magnet, and of the two parts of Hesse the northern was already represented in the North German Parliament. Moreover, it was easy to see that in case of an attempt to form such a confederation, the smaller states would be obliged to put themselves under the guidance of the most powerful, and that one could be no other than Bavaria. If the

states were in any manner to compromise their independence, every consideration urged to the acceptance of that leadership which, in times of danger, would afford the best protection. Union, under the leadership of Bavaria, was therefore out of the question. Either the states must remain quite independent, or they must in some way be linked with the fortunes of the North. Which of these two policies should be adopted depended, of course, for the most part, upon the action of the government of Munich.

After the course which Bavaria had taken in allying herself with Austria in the seven weeks' war, there would seem to have been every reason to anticipate the most active opposition to the policy of Prussia. It is not easy for a nation to go from the camp to the halls of legislation, without carrying with it something of its old hostilities. And yet it could not be concealed that in Bavaria there was a strong party which favored Prussian influence, and, perhaps, even Prussian alliance. Before the end of the year 1866 this party had become so strong as to compel the president of the Bavarian ministry to give way before its vigorous attacks, and the portfolio of Foreign Affairs was given to Prince Hohenlohe. This minister was known to have favored a firm alliance with Prussia, even as early as the Treaty of Prague, and therefore his appointment was one of peculiar significance. The Prussian party made haste to avail itself of the new reinforcement to its strength, and brought forward its views in the form of an address to the king.

It was urged that the policy of Bavaria should be the establishment of one common fatherland, united under a single central power and a single parliament. There should be, it was claimed, such an autonomy of the single parts as to allow them perfect freedom in the conduct of their local affairs. The liberties of the people should be guaranteed by the general government. For the accomplishment of these ends it was desirable that the states of Southern Germany should enter into the North German Union immediately, in order that they might have a voice in the formation of the Constitution.

These propositions, brought forward in the Bavarian parliament by the left, doubtless counted upon the support of the

new minister. But responsibility makes one conservative. It was soon found that Hohenlohe was no longer willing to adopt the extreme measures which he had favored before he had taken his seat at the head of the cabinet. But the debate on the address forced him to show his colors. Accordingly on the 19th of January, 1867, only two days after the address had been moved, he brought forward the programme of the government.

Although, in this declaration of policy, Prince Hohenlohe was far more specific in pointing out what ought to be avoided than in showing what ought to be done, yet there could be no mistaking the course which the government was intending to pursue. The minister declared, in substance, that a union with Austria was impossible; that the formation of a Southern Confederation would be to place the states of Southern Germany at the complete mercy of their neighbors; and that the former aim of Bavarian diplomacy, to enter into a close union with the North, was out of the question. In support of this last proposition, it was urged, on the one hand, that the Treaty of Prague would compel Prussia to reject such a proposal, even if advances should be made by the South, and, on the other, that the evident tendency in Northern Germany was to consolidate the individual powers into a single government, in a manner that would be in no way acceptable to the people of Bavaria.

Having thus disposed of the negative side of the question, the prince advanced to a consideration of the positive. In substance, his recommendation was that the Bavarian government, while maintaining absolute independence and sovereignty, enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia. In case of war with a foreign country, such an alliance would compel Bavaria to declare herself as Prussia's confederate. Under such circumstances the Bavarian army would be under the general direction of Prussia; and, therefore, if such a policy should be adopted, it would be in the highest degree desirable that not only the armies of Bavaria, but also those of the other Southwestern states should be so reorganized that they could be placed under one general direction. This, then, was the policy of the Bavarian government as openly declared. No entrance into the North German Union, but a military alli-

ance, under the command of Prussia. It was, perhaps, less than the national party had hoped ; it was certainly more than its opponents had expected.

In looking at the history of these international relations and the development of these new policies, there is nothing so astonishing as the blindness or stupidity of the French government in continuing to believe that the states of Southern Germany could yet be easily arrayed in military opposition to those of the North. These recommendations of Hohenlohe were made two full months before the famous discussion in the French Chambers, when Rouher, in justification of the course of his government, pretended to believe that a South German Union would yet be formed in opposition to Prussia. Nor indeed was this all. As if for the very purpose of opening the eyes of the French, the ministers of war of the Southern States came together at Stuttgart early in February, in order to complete the military organization recommended by the Bavarian minister. Thus, the four states south of the Main proceeded to carry out, under the very eyes of Napoleon, the military alliance which Bavaria had proposed, and which, as everybody knew, Prussia desired.* That Napoleon, even as late as the beginning of the recent war, rested his hopes of success so largely upon the support of the South German states, finds its best explanation in that period of diplomatic blindness and blunders which would seem to be a sufficient proof of diplomatic imbecility.

During the period consumed by the negotiations which we have just been considering, the tremendous consequences of the Prussian successes were unfolding themselves before the eyes of the French people. Although there were various con-

* It must be said in justice to French intelligence, that the obstinacy referred to was peculiar to the government alone. If the ministry persisted in ignorance, it was no fault of the opposition journals. "Where now," cried out the *Temps*, "is the confederation of South Germany, the invention of French diplomacy? Where are the stipulations of the Treaty of Prague? Vanished; vanished like the snow of the last week. The line of the Main, as Bismarck's organ for the quieting of Hohenlohe declared, is only a *fiction*. The introduction of the Prussian military system south of the Main is the next purpose of the Berlin cabinet. But let no man in France be deceived. The Prussianizing of the armies of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Hesse, and Baden is only the first step in the way of Prussianizing the whole of Germany."

jectures as to the future relations of Prussia and the other German states, south as well as north of the Main, yet the fact is undeniable that the French press saw that the result of the war would be to accomplish a complete transformation of the German nationality. In the place of the Germanic Confederation of 1815, immense and unwieldy from the very nature and complexity of its government, France was now to have as a neighbor one single, compact nationality, under the form of a confederation indeed, but still confederate only in name, since in reality all its forces were to be concentrated in the hands of a single nation and a single ruler. There was no denying the fact that the Prussians had displayed all the best characteristics of a great military power. The energy and compactness of their army, the rapidity of their movements, the excellence of their weapons, and, above all, the grandeur of their success, made it certain that the Prussians would no longer treat with France save on terms of a haughty equality. And then, worst of all, the French army was in no condition to take the field, in case the friendly relations which then existed should be interrupted. From whatever point the question was viewed, it appeared hedged about with difficulties, and it was evident that the most careful statesmanship would be required to save the nation from humiliation, if not from dishonor.

But the difficulties for the Emperor himself were far more formidable than for the nation at large. If his government had not been committed to a definite policy, it would perhaps have been no very difficult task to convince the French people that the German question was in a fair way of happy settlement. But such easy argument was made impossible by the previous declarations of the Emperor. The mischievous letter of June 11 had promulgated the imperial policy with all the authority of an oracle, without that oracular indefiniteness which would admit of a double interpretation. It was plain to everybody that the government had intended to say diplomatically that Prussia must not become too strong, nor Austria too weak, since the former was to be the enemy and the latter the ally of France; and, moreover, that the smaller German states must be kept aloof from both, in order that a Rhenish confederation might be built up into an effectual barrier against the too great aggrandizement of either.

When, therefore, in the face of these declarations, the people saw Austria put quite out of the game, and Prussia getting all the smaller states into her own hand, it was impossible to restrain their discontent. They remembered how Napoleon had entered upon his "Italian mission" for the evident purpose of building up a confederation of Italian states, which would need to recognize the Napoleonic dynasty as its creator and protector, and how the affair had ended by giving to Victor Emmanuel a single kingdom which extended from the Alps to the *Ægates*. And now, with this result in their remembrance, the people were bitter in their declarations that the German policy of the Emperor was in a fair way to turn out even worse at the hands of Bismarck than had the Italian at the hands of Cavour.

With all of these facts and fancies seething in the minds of the French nation, it was no easy task for Napoleon either to explain the past or to satisfy public demands for the future. But silence was no longer possible. M. Druyn de Lhuys was therefore dismissed, and the *ad interim* successor, M. La Valette, published the circular of the 16th of September.

This paper, addressed to all French ambassadors at foreign courts, was composed with unusual skill, and even with something more than the ordinary grace of French diplomacy. It betrayed no impatient mood, and concealed every trace of imperial disappointment. Perhaps it would not be too much to say that there was pervading it something of an air of jubilation. The obligations of the Treaty of 1815, which for forty years had bound eighty millions of people in virtual opposition to France, were at length broken. Each of the great nations was now restored to the plenitude of its independence. To this condition of European affairs France ought to take no exception. Proud of her own unity, she ought not to regret or oppose the work of assimilation which had just been going on in Germany. Rendered more homogeneous by a better adjustment of territorial boundaries, Europe afforded guarantees for the peace of the Continent which, to France, could be neither injurious nor dangerous. In the new order of international relations, France would have forty millions of inhabitants, while Germany would have only thirty-seven millions, of which twenty-nine would belong to the Confederation of the North and

eight to the Confederation of the South. Austria would have thirty-five millions, Italy twenty-six, and Spain eighteen. What was there in this distribution to disquiet the French people? In summing up, La Valette used these words: "From the elevated point of view from which the imperial government considers the destinies of Europe, the horizon appears to it to be free from menacing eventualities. Formidable problems, which required solution, because they were not of a nature to be suppressed, were weighing heavily upon the destinies of peoples. These problems, which might have presented themselves in more difficult times, have received their natural solution without concussions of excessive violence, and without dangerous recourse to revolutionary passions. A peace which rests upon such foundations will be a durable peace. As for France, wherever she directs her attention, she sees nothing which can impede her advancement or trouble her prosperity."

Since Talleyrand turned his own definition of words to the purposes of diplomacy, there has been no more adroit state paper than that of the 16th of September. And yet at a single point it was fatally vulnerable.

The burden of the circular was to show that the changes brought about by the war were for the general advantage of all Europe, inasmuch as by them the peace of Europe was secured, and for the special advantage of France, inasmuch as the obnoxious treaties of 1815 were no longer of binding force. For the ears of every nation the circular contained a paragraph of smooth words, and its general tone was unequivocal concerning the pacific tendencies of the times. And yet almost absolutely concealed in the midst of these diplomatic euphuisms was a single sentence that throws an honest doubt upon the integrity of the whole. After speaking at length of the peaceful disposition of the Empire, he adds: "And yet in the emotions which have prevailed in the country there is a legitimate sentiment which it is necessary to recognize and state with precision. The results of the last war contain a grave lesson, and one which has cost our army nothing of its honor. They teach us the necessity, for the defence of our territory, of perfecting our military organization without delay."

Here, then, was something quite at war with the rest of the

circular. How was it to be interpreted? The journals at once declared that there was no need of incurring all the expense of a reorganization, if the minister's presentation of European politics was a true one. The conviction naturally enough at once became quite general, that the Emperor had some ulterior designs, quite different from those displayed in the letter of La Valette. And the Emperor's enemies, on both sides of the Rhine, were not reluctant to use against him the shafts which had been furnished by his minister. The Prussian cabinet had no occasion to publish their comments on the French policy, but it is not difficult to imagine that their reasoning was something like the following: The French objections, as declared by La Valette to the Treaty of 1815, were that France could have no quarrel with any state or province between the Netherlands and the Tyrol, without incurring the open hostility of eighty millions who were bound together for mutual protection. Inasmuch as those treaty obligations now no longer exist, the Emperor imagines that the danger of a united opposition to any French aggression has passed away. In view of this fact it is easy to see why Napoleon thinks that a military reorganization is needed. His pacific declarations will have no meaning whatever after the moment when his army is ready to cope with ours and he can find a decent pretext for war. Such in the main was the reasoning of the Prussian journals; and if we may judge from the continued activity of the military bureau, we are safe in believing it was substantially the reasoning of the Prussian government. Thus while the French people, as best they might through a muzzled press, growled at the inconsistency of their government, the Prussians accepted the military clause of La Valette's paper as a hint that they must be ready for such "menacing eventualities" as might arise in the future.

The circular letter of La Valette bore the date of the 16th of September. It soon became apparent that the military suggestions of the paper were not without their meaning. The shops working in the interest of M. Chassepot and the government were crowding to their utmost capacity the manufacture of arms, and a high commission of ministers and marshals, with the Emperor at its head, was busy in maturing

plans for the reorganization. The results of the labors of this commission were placed before the people in the columns of the *Moniteur* on the 12th of December.

The commission declared that France ought to be in condition to place in the field an army of 800,000 men, and to organize in addition a force of sufficient strength to insure internal order as well as to defend the frontiers and man the forts in the absence of the regular army. For the attainment of this end, the commission proposed to divide the military forces of the nation into three classes, — an *armée active*, a reserve, and a *garde nationale mobile*, each to consist of 400,000 men. This enormous force was to be kept up by a most sweeping conscription. Every year so many young men as were needed for the first two classes were to be drawn, and their position, whether in active service or in the reserve, was to be determined by lot. Those drawn were to remain six years in service, and then were to be transferred for three years to the *garde nationale mobile*. The army in reserve was to be divided into two parts, one of which was to be brought into service at the call of the Minister of War, and the other by decree of the Emperor.

Thus it will be seen that the recommendations of the commission would not only impose an enormous burden upon all classes of society, but that they would sweep away one of the *latif*, namely, the right to fix the military contingent. The most important constitutional prerogatives of the Corps Legislatif contemplated the placing of 600,000 men at the permanent disposition of the Minister of War, — a fact that was in most flagrant violation of the Constitution and of the tendencies of public opinion. The discontents, therefore, which had shown themselves after the publication of the September circular, and had kept themselves in check but for want of something definite to oppose, broke out, on the publication of this report, into demonstrations of the utmost violence. The political temperature was so fast rising to the revolutionary point, that the government found it necessary to recede. The official journals made haste to declare that the recommendations of the commission had been only “a preparatory study,” and that they admitted of such modifications as, in the future,

circumstances might seem to dictate. Thus, without abandoning the positions taken, the commission withdrew the report from the public eye, probably hoping that at some future time it might be brought forward with better prospects of success.

From this *dénouement* of the Emperor's first attempt at military reorganization, it is natural to draw these two inferences : first, that any suspicions aroused on the right bank of the Rhine by the circular of La Valette must have been immensely strengthened by the purposes of the imperial government as revealed in the military report ; and secondly, that the Emperor was fully convinced that he must either abandon the idea of remodelling the army on the plan proposed by the commission, or he must win the French people into a mood more friendly to its acceptance. That the so-called reforms of the 19th of January were intended simply as a sop to the Cerberus of public opinion may not be affirmed ; but, in view of all the circumstances, to suspect that such was the case is neither unreasonable nor unnatural.

With the intrinsic importance of the constitutional changes that were inaugurated by the French government in the early part of the year 1867 we have nothing whatever in this connection to do. It is enough to say that, if they were intended to conciliate public opinion and prepare the way for the desired military reform, they were a complete failure. The discussions which followed the opening of the Chambers make it perfectly plain that the changes proposed were generally regarded as a mere shift of form, without any essential change of substance. Although the right of interpellation, which the Emperor now proposed to grant, — a right which forms so important an element in English usage, — was in itself received with considerable favor, yet the enthusiasm felt was fully counterbalanced by the dissatisfaction manifested at the loss of certain other privileges that were to be withdrawn. The reluctance with which the legislative body abandoned the right to discuss the Emperor's address was quite enough to dampen all zeal for the other features of the reform. Even the satisfaction that was experienced in certain quarters at the modification of the restrictions on the press proved to be momentary only ; for both the publishers and the public soon

learned that the tribunal to which the new law made the press accountable was no less exacting than had been the executive power itself. If anything additional were needed to bring to an end all favor toward the new laws for the control of the press, it was furnished to one party by Rochefort and his fellows, and to the other by the manner in which they were dealt with.

Thus the hostile agitations which had been first excited by the German policy of the Emperor in the course of the war, and which had been considerably increased by the circular of La Valette and the report of the military commission, were not very essentially modified by those January reforms from which the government, as was thought, had hoped so much. In spite of the Emperor's efforts, the public discontents remained unchanged.

Under these circumstances the eyes of the nation were turned with unusual interest to the Corps Legislatif. There had been no session since the outbreak of the German war, and it was therefore anticipated that the foreign relations of France would be taken under most searching review. Nor were the people disappointed. When, on the 14th of March, the German policy of the government came up for consideration, it was evident that the discussion was to manifest all the heat that had been generated by the most intense and opposite convictions concerning questions of the most vital importance. What had been the causes, remote or immediate, which had secured the consolidation of Germany? What part had been taken by the imperial government in the preparation for these events, and in their development? In what situation had the new order of affairs left France? In view of the changes that had befallen the neighboring powers, what foreign policy could best secure to France the benefits of a lasting peace and, at the same time, fortify her in the international position of which she must not see herself deprived? These were the momentous questions to be considered, and to their discussion was brought all the energy and eloquence of the most gifted French orators.

Probably no man in France was so thoroughly unfitted by education and habit of thought for a candid observation of the

great events which were occurring as was M. Thiers. As historian of the Consulate and Empire, he had dwelt in an atmosphere of French glory until he had come to look upon France as nothing less than the sun about which the other nations of Europe must revolve in a kind of planetary subordination. It was not in the least unnatural, therefore, when he saw this planetary system, which had contributed so much to the glory of his country, disturbed, that he should desire to enter his protest, and to give a lecture to those through whose instrumentality he believed the disturbance to have been made. Moreover, the intensity of his feelings was probably somewhat increased by the fact that he foresaw the course likely to be taken by the states south of the Main. He beheld the formation of the North German Union, and perceived that all the efforts of the French to counterbalance the weight of that union by the formation of a similar one in the South were likely to fail. His feelings, therefore, sought the first opportunity for expression. Although the friends of the government had no occasion to anticipate any compliments for their master, yet all were so anxious to hear the old parliamentarian on so important a subject, that the regular order was pushed aside and the Tribune was assigned to him for the 14th of March.

The argument of Thiers, which was three hours in length, was an energetic protest against the politics of the nineteenth century and a plea for that of the seventeenth. His leading thought was that in former times France had been surrounded by a large family of small nations which were dependent on her for protection, but that now, thanks to the policy of consolidation, the many small governments were disappearing and a few powerful ones were rising in their stead. On the old policy of sustaining the smaller surrounding states the supremacy of France had rested. But now the situation had rapidly changed. Through the efforts of France, Italy had been united under a single crown, and, what was still worse, by means of the very unity thus secured, a hundred and fifty thousand Austrian troops had been held on the Italian border, and thus the Prussians had been able to triumph at Sadowa. Thus the French government had done its full part toward securing the ascendancy of

Prussia. Nor was this all. Greater evils were yet to come. France must not be deceived. If this fatal policy was not arrested, Prussia would soon have control of the forty millions of Germans, and Russia would trace her boundaries south of Constantinople. In opposition to this tendency, it was the plain duty of France to let her voice be heard. By joining hands with England and the secondary powers, their mutual interests might be protected. In this way alone could peace without dishonor be preserved. At the close of the speech one of his colleagues declared: "It is true, M. Thiers knows how to secure all, but he makes of France the gendarme of Europe."

On the following day the question was discussed by MM. Garnier-Pagès and Ollivier. Neither of these orators agreed with the other, nor indeed with M. Thiers. The former believed that Germany was permanently divided into three antagonistic portions, and that France, therefore, need have no concern for the future. Ollivier, on the other hand, saw that the acquisitions of Bismarck would not only be permanent, but would also be extended. Whether agreeable to France or not, the states in the South would yet, despite the Treaty of Prague, reach out the hand across the Main, and knock for admission to the Union. What, then, ought France to do? In his opinion, she should recognize the fact as in no way directed against herself. The forced annexations of Prussia were indeed a matter for protest, but not so the formation of the North German Union. It had been the policy of France to allow the governments of Europe to form such alliances as they chose, and such a privilege could not be denied the German states. Only by a friendly recognition of the situation in Germany could Prussia be withdrawn from that alliance with Russia which, if continued, would surely result in the fall of Constantinople.

These pacific declarations of Ollivier called out the military spirit of Count Latour. In his estimation a war with Prussia was "inevitable, and only a question of time." The duty of France, therefore, was to enter into a firm alliance with Austria for the protection of the three great interests that were common to them both, — the protection of Constantinople, the

prevention of the re-establishment of the German Empire, and the defence of the temporal power of the Pope. With such an alliance it would be easy to control the South German states, and to say to Prussia, "Thus far and no farther."

The military zeal thus far more or less conspicuous in the debates, M. Rouher attempted to dampen, while at the same time he made a vigorous effort to defend the imperial policy. He claimed that the whole world had been taken by surprise at the issue of the battle of Sadowa, and that, although the results of the struggle were to be felt for centuries, France had been compelled to decide upon its action without the delay of a single moment. It had been the imperial policy to preserve peace where it existed, and to restore it at the earliest possible moment between the nations then at war. And with what result? The victor had been restrained before the gates of Vienna; the cession of nine hundred thousand Bavarians with their territory to Prussia had been prevented; the terms of the conqueror toward Saxony, Würtemberg, and the other Southern powers had been modified; and the length of the war had been limited to twenty days. This record was enough to show that France had committed no mistake. The present hegemony of Prussia had arisen from no weakness of imperial policy, but simply from Prussian ascendancy in the Zollverein. Nor, indeed, was the issue of events to be regretted. The condition of Germany, since the dissolution of the Confederation, was more favorable to the interests of France than it had been before. Thiers had declared that the old Confederation had been purely defensive; but in answer it could be said that the three hundred thousand men whom Prussia mobilized in 1859 had restrained the Emperor before the quadrilateral and led him to sign the Treaty of Villafranca, rather than further to endanger France for the sake of Italy. The government established by the congress of Vienna had been a standing threat to France; but in the place of a single Confederation, with seventy-five millions bound to avenge every supposed injury, there were now simply three fragments that were independent of each other. The North German Union counted but twenty-nine millions; even with the reinforcement of the Southern states it could scarcely exceed thirty-two millions (?) ;

while the remaining thirty-three millions were under the control of Austria. In these three divisions of Germany there could be no possible danger for France. Even if, as was claimed, Prussia should desire the Zuiderzee, it would only be necessary for England and France together to say to her that the time of consolidations is past.

The weak point of Rouher's position did not escape the keen eye of Jules Favre. "Either these peaceful representations are merely a necessary pretence," declared he, "or the government is bound to withdraw its proposition for the reorganization of the army." He further added that, in the time of the old German Confederation, France had needed for protection not a tenth of the force now proposed. In his opinion, the only means of preventing German unity were in the hands of the dissatisfied German rulers and the oppressed German people. He would have no hesitation whatever in locking arms with the Elector of Hesse and the Duke of Nassau for the purpose of protecting their common interests.

This bold declaration of Jules Favre brought to his feet one of the intimates of the Emperor, Granier de Cassagnac. As it was believed he would speak the language of the Tuileries as well as his own, his words were listened to with far greater interest than their inherent importance simply would have deserved. He believed, with Ollivier, that the tendency of Germany was toward consolidation; with Thiers, that such consolidation was dangerous to France. But his confidence was in the patriotism of the country. He believed in "*natural boundaries*." A chain of mountains and a river were to him a far better protection than a border picket with Prussian needle-guns before it. France had a right to insist upon being heard on all questions where her own safety was at stake, and in such junctures she must define her own interest. Finally, he would have peace if it were allowed, but war if it were necessary.

Now this fiery debate, although it showed no harmony of ideas and no unity of policy, could not be without its influence on the German side of the Rhine. After the words of Thiers, Latour, and Cassagnac, there was no escaping the conclusion that the military spirit of France was awake; and in view of

the recent recommendations of the military commission, it was by no means unnatural to surmise that the French government would be disposed to make all haste in preparing the army for every emergency. After such declarations as had been made in the debate by the friends of the Emperor, of course the pacific phrases of La Valette's circular passed for nothing. When it is remembered that at this moment the people of Germany were completely ignorant of the existing contract between the North and the South, it cannot be considered strange that they looked upon the situation with something of alarm. The general anxiety found open expression in the German Parliament. The very next day after the fiery expressions of Cassagnac had found utterance at Paris, a member of Parliament at Berlin called the attention of the government to the widespread fear that it might yet turn out as the French prophesied and desired, namely, that the Southern states would enter with France and Austria into a close alliance against the North. This expression of a general sentiment called for a reply on the part of the government, and Count Bismarck made his response the occasion of revealing the existence of a treaty which had been signed some months before, but which up to that moment had been kept a profound secret. Under the circumstances no other possible declaration could have been received with such enthusiasm as the one made by the chancellor. It appeared that an offensive and defensive alliance had long since been formed between the Union and the states south of the Main. On the following day the full text of the treaties was published in the official gazettes at Berlin and at Munich. Thus only three days after Rouher and his colleagues had declared that their hopes of the future in reference to Germany were formed on an alliance with the *Confédération du Sud*, it was proclaimed to the world, not only that the Southern states had entered into league with the North German Union, but also that they had agreed, in case of war, to transfer all their military forces to the command of the king of Prussia.

The circumstances which had led to the formation of this treaty rendered its publication at this moment peculiarly annoying to the pride of the French. The humiliation was

shared not only by those who saw their theory of the "South German Union" vanish into thin air and made ridiculous, but also by the whole French people; for it soon came to be known that the treaty was simply a victory of Prussian over French diplomacy. A mere glance at the course of events after the great battle is enough to convince one that the French did their full share in the work of converting the Southern states from enemies into allies of Prussia.

In the settlement of affairs after the battle, the disposition of Bismarck toward the Southern states was scarcely less severe than toward those of the North. As the latter were forced to pay for their Austrian partiality with their crowns, the former were required to abandon a portion of their territory. Electoral Hesse and so much of Bavaria as lay north of the Main were demanded; and in order that this tax might not fall with unjust severity upon two governments alone, Würtemberg and Baden were required to pay an indemnity to the others. In this threatening situation the cabinets of all the Southern states, with the exception of Baden, turned to the French, and besought their good offices at the Prussian court. Of course nothing could be more acceptable to the French than such an errand. It would evidently atone for a multitude of diplomatic sins in the eyes of the French people if the French minister could go before Europe and declare that they had restrained the victor when about to seize upon the territory of nine hundred thousand Bavarians and the whole of Northern Hesse. Accordingly, M. Druyn de Lhuys instructed the French envoy at Berlin, M. Benedetti, to use his best efforts in behalf of the states which were threatened. Bismarck heard what the envoy had to offer, but chose to reply to the ministers of the Southern states themselves. It was no difficult task to convince them that they were committing a fatal mistake in turning to France for protection rather than to Prussia. The Prussian minister declared to them that he knew perfectly well the price of French favor for any schemes of annexation which Prussia might propose. He had but to abandon to the Emperor Rhenish Hesse and Rhenish Bavaria with the fortresses of Mayence and Landau in order to secure the support of the French for any policy which Prussia might adopt. In

view of these facts, would it not be safer and perhaps more patriotic to turn to a German rather than a Frankish power for alliance? The argument was completely successful. Perhaps it was the alarming hint which it contained that made the Southern powers, with a single exception, so anxious to hasten the negotiations. Be that as it may, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, which pledged all the powers, excepting Hesse, to mutual support and protection, and which placed all the military forces under the command of the king of Prussia, was signed on the 22d of August.

In view of the peculiar relations of the French government to the various parties of the treaty, it certainly cannot be considered strange that there was a general desire to keep the alliance for a time secret. The military system in the Southern states was in great disorder, and, until their armies could be run into the Prussian mould, it would be manifestly unwise to incur the risk of war by proclaiming so brilliant a diplomatic victory on the part of Prussia, and so humiliating a defeat on the part of France. The secret was successfully kept from the 22d of August until the 19th of the following March, when the alliance was announced in the North German Parliament by Bismarck himself. At this time the military reorganization in the South had so far progressed as to remove all prudential considerations; and accordingly when the fears of the Germans themselves began to be aroused, the temptation to prick the French bubble that was causing so much alarm was absolutely irresistible.

The proclamation of this treaty could not but arouse the attention of all Europe. In Germany it was everywhere regarded as bridging the Main, and as bringing the whole country, at least for military purposes, into one compact empire. The English journals universally recognized it as a most humiliating defeat of French diplomacy. The "Daily News" expressed its satisfaction that, at length, the world was taking care of itself without the aid of the French; and the "Advertiser" thought that the French national pride could find its only satisfaction in the overthrow of the Empire. The leading journal of Vienna declared that Austria, in so grave a juncture, must not be turned from her true course by any false

sentimentalism ; that she could only save her position in Europe by means of an alliance with the other German states.

To the Southern states, however, the situation was as yet by no means free from embarrassment. Not only were they to be protected, but Prussia was to be supported. The condition of the army, notwithstanding the efforts of Bismarck and Hohenlohe, was but partially rescued from chaos. The commission which had undertaken to reform the military system, and prevent the possibility of such another fiasco as that at Sadowa, was achieving no very important results. Every ruler and every military commander seemed to consider his honor bound up in the preservation of military individuality. Notwithstanding the proclamation of the alliance even, no very great progress in the way of reorganization took place until Luxembourg was threatened, and, as Professor Müller has happily said, the cry, "Hannibal ante Portas," was heard throughout the land.

The little Grand Duchy of Luxembourg rejoices in a population of two hundred thousand souls and one of the strongest fortresses of Europe. Its history has been scarcely less German than that of Baden and Hesse. As early as 963 the territory was purchased by one Siegfried, who succeeded in raising his family to the first rank, and among whose descendants are to be counted at least four of the German emperors. With the other Northern possessions of Charles the Bold, it came more completely under German influence and control on the marriage of Mary with the Archduke of Austria. Since that day it has been twice overrun by the French, but the treaties of Utrecht and Paris, which followed the conquests, compelled its restoration.

When at Vienna, in 1815, it was deemed necessary to establish a fortress of the first rank for the purpose of protecting the northwestern boundary of Germany, it was but natural, in view of its history and location, to select as the site of the new works the old fortified city of Luxembourg. Of course the work of completing and occupying the fortress should from the first have been assigned to Prussia. But in a moment of jealousy or weakness it was given to the king of Holland. It was not long, however, before it was discovered that the prince who

had merited their contempt by taking his ease for a great part of eighteen years at an English fireside, while his country was overrun by the common enemy, was not the one to have charge of the common interests of the frontier. Accordingly by the protocol of November 3, 1815, the command of the fortress was assigned to the king of Prussia, with the understanding that it was to be garrisoned by troops from Holland and from Prussia, in equal numbers. In the following year, however, a special treaty between Holland and Prussia increased the proportion of Prussian troops to three fourths. This method of occupation was confirmed, not only by the treaty of July 20, 1819, between England, Russia, and Austria on the one side, and Prussia and Holland on the other, but also by the diet of the old German confederation. By this last act of confirmation, Luxembourg was adopted as a "Bundesfestung," and thus placed in the same general relations to the country as Mainz and Rastadt. To ask the Germans, therefore, under ordinary circumstances, to abandon either of these strongholds, would be much like demanding that the French should give up Metz or Strasbourg. In addition, it needs only to be said, that, on the 26th of February, 1857, a convention held for the further consideration of the relations of Luxembourg, conferred upon the king of Prussia the right to occupy the fortress with a garrison exclusively Prussian.

In November of 1866, Prince Henry of Orange, at the opening of the grand-ducal assembly of Luxembourg, declared that, inasmuch as the German Confederation had been dissolved, Prussia could no longer claim the right to occupy the fortress in the name of that Confederation. Though this reasonable declaration provoked no reply on the part of the Prussian government, it gave ample opportunity to learn the state of popular opinion on that question in Germany. It soon became manifest that, concerning the occupation of the fortress, opinion was nearly equally divided. There were those who maintained that the treaties gave to Prussia the right to hold the fortress, irrespective of the Confederation; others took the ground that Prussia could not but admit the position taken by the prince. It appeared uncertain, therefore, how the affair would end in case of a formal demand for evacuation.

While Germany was maturing an opinion on this question of evacuation, one of far greater importance was agitating the courts of Holland and France. In view of the evacuation which was hoped for, by Prussia, negotiations had been commenced looking toward the sale of the grand-duchy by the king of Holland to the Emperor of the French. These negotiations, having in view not only the evacuation, but what was of far greater importance, the complete alienation from Germany of a portion of the old Germanic Confederation, were intended to be kept a profound secret until after the evacuation should take place. The affair miscarried, however, through the timidity or the prudence, whichever it may be called, of the king of Holland. However faultless may be his genealogy, William III. is no successor of William the Silent. At the last moment he seems to have perceived, what any one else would have seen at the outset, that, in case the bargain should be fully closed, and should be unacceptable to Prussia, and war should be declared, the Netherlands would be the battle-ground, and that, whatever might be the fate of Luxembourg, the mouths of the Scheldt and the Rhine would be in the greatest danger of being permanently held by Prussia. Whatever may be thought of his patriotism in trading off a portion of his subjects for the purpose of paying his personal debts, or of his diplomatic skill in not going at once to Prussia, it cannot be denied that he showed a glimmer of sense in taking a second look before it was too late. Whatever else he might be lacking, of that part of valor which Falstaff deemed the better part he was the possessor of superabundance.

The treaty of sale was completed on the 22d of March, and was to be ratified by Holland and France before the 5th of April. Napoleon seems, strangely enough, to have counted with considerable confidence on the consent of Prussia, especially if the evacuation should have previously taken place. If he should be disappointed even, he might take the treaty in his hand as a *fait accompli*, and demand the evacuation. It will be seen that to the success of the movement every consideration urged the utmost secrecy. But the king of Holland, after the negotiations between Paris and the Hague had been in progress during the whole of December, January, and February, and the

greater part of March, let out the secret by calling in the Prussian ambassador, and making a confession of the whole affair. It was of course communicated at once to the Prussian government. As early as the 25th of March the ambassador was instructed to reply that to such a transaction Prussia could never give her consent. This prompt declaration not only put an end to all prospect of ratification on the part of Holland, but also led the government of Luxembourg to deny in the official journal the report that any such sale was likely to take place.

To Napoleon, however, this termination of the affair was the most annoying possible. No sooner did it appear that he was to be a second time checkmated by Bismarck, than the wits found it an easy matter to make him ridiculous. They represented him as scouring over Europe, and America even, in search of political game, and finally as going slyly into a game-shop and attempting to buy a hare, in order that he might not be obliged to return home with an empty pouch. But even in this he was frustrated by the ever-watchful Bismarck. The imperial sportsman was not only prevented from catching anything, but he was also not allowed to purchase anything for his game-bag.

Stung by representations like these, the Emperor fixed upon the policy of making such a demand of Prussia as would either mask his own retreat, or transfer the question from the cabinet to the field. If France could not have Luxembourg, Prussia should not remain in the fortress. As the protest of Prussia had prevented the purchase, the protest of France should prevent the occupation. The French government, therefore, sent a note to Berlin, declaring that the occupation of Luxembourg was a perpetual threat to France, and demanding that the fortress should be evacuated. The response to this warlike demand was in substance, that Luxembourg could no more in fairness be regarded as a threat to France than could Mainz or Landau, or, indeed, than could Metz or Strasburg to Germany; and that as for the evacuation, Prussia did not feel qualified to decide until both the people of Germany and those powers which had conferred the right of occupation had been consulted. In view of this reply, France, of course, could but await the result.

Now, it must be borne in mind, that up to the moment when the demand of France was made, the people of Germany had no knowledge whatever of the fact that Prussia had, in the most positive manner, refused to consent to the sale. The two questions of alienation and evacuation were, therefore, in the public mind intimately connected with each other. On the 1st of April Parliament had put to Bismarck two questions: first, whether Prussia was aware of the treaty of sale; and, secondly, whether the government was ready to defend the union of Luxembourg with the rest of Germany, and especially its own right to the occupation of the fortress? To the first of these questions the minister gave a full and an affirmative answer. To the second he responded that, for diplomatic reasons, he could make no reply. Thus, the information given was just enough to show that the Grand Duchy was threatened, but not enough to show that the danger of surrender was already past. The effect upon the people was what may be easily imagined. The outcry over the possible surrender of a territory so truly German was loud and distinct. The very temperate manner in which the question had been treated by Bismarck led many to believe that the government was really on the point of surrendering all right and title to the territory so much desired by the French. The opponents of Prussia everywhere cried out, "Now we are to see the results of the mysterious conferences at Biarritz. Bismarck is not a whit better than Cavour. Just as the latter at Plombières, while pretending to treat merely of Savoy and Nice, swept all Italy under the Italian crown; so the former, by trading off some of his countrymen on the Rhine, is attempting to bribe the neighboring powers to assist in a similar compression of all Germany under the power of Prussia." Nor was the cry confined to the foes of the government. Those who had watched this growth of Prussian power with most satisfaction and enthusiasm declared that the government could not afford to sacrifice the popularity which it had won for itself at Sadowa. From every quarter came opposition to the movement, and opposition only. All saw in it the first step toward that "natural boundary," which Granier de Cassagnac had so much preferred to a border picket.

It was soon manifest that a strong party in the South, as well as in the North, demanded that an immediate and decisive answer be returned, let the consequences be what they might. What may be called the military element in Prussia took the ground that war, rather than withdrawal, would alone satisfy the German people; and that, in view of the imperfect readiness of the French army and the French arsenals, the sooner war was begun the better. It was well known that in France military preparations were going on with most feverish activity. All the shops in the Empire were employing every possible man in the manufacture of chassepots, and the foundries were working day and night in the interests of the artillery, while, to provide for the cavalry, agents were collecting horses in every corner of the land. Von Moltke, and those about him, urged that in the course of a year the complexion of the affair would be entirely changed. Then the French might demand Mainz and Landau as well as Luxembourg, and, in case of refusal, grasp the sword at a moment when they were fully prepared to wield it. In the light of such colossal preparations as were going on in France, it was urged that the true policy was to pronounce an ultimatum, and, in case of necessity, to strike at once into the heart of the enemy. That such a course would have secured the enthusiastic support of all Germany, South as well as North, is abundantly shown by the decision of Bavaria and Hesse. Of all the Southern states, these two had been most reluctant to join fortunes with Prussia, and yet, when this question began to assume threatening proportions, they made haste to fall into line with the others. The lower house in Bavaria, by a formal address to the minister, expressed the hope that the government would allow no doubt to exist that the state would devote all its energies to the protection of the common fatherland. On the 11th of April, the Grand Duchy of Hesse, in imitation of its neighbor, entered into an alliance with Prussia, and its soldiery was at once attached to the Eleventh Army Corps of the Confederation. In Bavaria and in Hesse, as well as in Baden and in Würtemberg, Prussian officers were everywhere giving directions in regard to the reorganization of the troops on the Prussian basis, and the troops reorganized were everywhere learning the

use of the needle-gun. From all these indications it was evident enough that, if Bismarck was to derive his final answer to France and Holland from the German people, there could be no cession of Luxembourg without a general war, and, indeed, no evacuation of the fortress except on the most satisfactory conditions.

But concerning the other source from which Bismarck's reply was to receive its inspiration, there was somewhat of uncertainty. The powers which had signed the Treaty of 1839 could by no means be counted upon for supporting the tenacity of Germany. Before a formal appeal to the powers could be made, however, the Austrian minister, Von Beust, proposed that the Grand Duchy should be ceded to Belgium, as it had desired to be in 1830; and that, in consideration of so important an addition, Belgium should restore to France the territory of which the latter had been deprived by the second Treaty of Paris. This proposition, supported by France and Austria, which were now believed to be in close alliance, might have been in the highest degree embarrassing to Prussia but for the superb reply of the king of Belgium. When the matter was proposed to him his immediate response was, "I cannot barter away one of my countrymen." Upon this Von Beust came forward with a second proposal, which was that Luxembourg should on the one hand be declared neutral territory, and that on the other it should be abandoned by the Prussian garrison. It was on the basis of this recommendation that Russia proposed a meeting of the powers which had signed the treaty establishing the present relations of the territory concerned. The consent of Prussia, however, could be gained only with the express understanding that it would not give up its right to hold the fortress save on the condition that Europe would guarantee the strictest neutrality of the Grand Duchy. Bismarck claimed that if Prussia gave so strong a proof of her desire for peace and reconciliation as to abandon the fortress which the powers had conferred upon her, it was but right that those powers should grant as effectual security for the border in the future as Prussia had granted in the past. With this understanding the conference assembled in London on the 7th of May. The main question was settled before the plenipo-

tentiaries came together, consequently the details were easily arranged. England alone stood in the way of an immediate adjustment. Inasmuch as the terms which Prussia insisted upon bound all the powers to take up arms against any state which should violate the neutrality of Luxembourg, England hesitated to place herself under an obligation to call her armies into the field at a moment's notice. As the demand, however, would put a curb alike upon all the powers, its reasonableness could not long be resisted, and accordingly on the 11th day of May the treaty received the signatures of all the plenipotentiaries.

As soon as the matter of neutrality and occupation had been settled, a question arose concerning the future relations of the Grand Duchy with the Zollverein. The plenipotentiary from Luxembourg inquired whether the treaty just formed would interfere with the commercial relations which existed between his country and the different states of Germany. It was evident that, much as Tornaco had desired annexation to France, he saw that, as such an annexation was now impossible, there was great injury to the industrial interests of his little state by its exclusion from the great advantages of the Zollverein. All his energies were, therefore, now directed to the preservation of the old commercial relations. His desires and hopes in this regard were, of course, encouraged by Prussia. To the immense annoyance of the French ambassador, who, naturally enough, desired to see the last link which bound Luxembourg to Germany severed, the convention decided that the neutrality extended to military affairs only, and that it could in no way interfere with any commercial alliance which the Grand Duchy might choose to enter into.

Thus the "Luxembourg Question" was settled. The advantage was manifestly, at all points, on the side of Prussia, and yet it had been so adroitly secured as to leave no possible grounds for remonstrance. The sacrifice of so powerful a position gave abundant evidence to the whole of Europe that the desires of the nation were pacific, while, at the same time, the stringency of the conditions on which the troops were to be withdrawn gave equal proof that the proper security of the German border was of far more importance to Prussia than

the preservation of peace. To France, however, the adjustment had no agreeable phase whatever. If the government experienced any satisfaction in seeing the fortress evacuated by the Prussians, the pleasure was more than counterbalanced by the chagrin felt at the fact that, in the very act of retreating, Prussia had gained an advantage by transferring the guardianship of the border from herself to the powers which had signed the treaty.

With the adjustment of the various relations of Luxembourg, the diplomatic questions to which the battle of Sadowa gave rise may be said to have been settled. In every one of them the French government was outwitted. If the question at issue had been of such a nature as to leave to France no alternative but interference, the judgment of the world would have been less severe on the course pursued. But it was generally felt that Napoleon had blundered into needless difficulties, and then had, in every case, been obliged to retire with his colors bedraggled in the dust. The resulting humiliation, shared as it was to a greater or less extent by the whole country, was enough to lead to most active preparations for war; and when those preparations were supposed to be sufficiently complete, to induce the nation to rush into a death-struggle on the slightest pretext, and, as infamously declared by the prime minister, with "a light heart."

C. K. ADAMS.